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PROF. RICHMAN: Good morning. I am Dan Richman. I
teach here at Fordham. This panel is entitled "The Expanding
Prosecutorial Role from Trial Counsel to Investigator and
Administrator."
To put that in perspective, in the last panel discussion we heard
about some particular choices that prosecutors have been making,
both in the U.S. Attorney's Office and in the Justice Department as
a whole, with regard to concurrent jurisdiction cases.
What I would like to focus on now is not a particular kind of a
decision, but the whole idea of prosecutors making decisions with
regard to investigative priorities and with regard to how cases
should be handled once a particular case is selected.
For this purpose we have a phenomenal panel that encompasses
experience both in the federal system and a decent number of aca-
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demics who, notwithstanding the critique about academics, actually
know something about the federal criminal justice system as well.
We have with us, starting on my left, Mary Jo White, the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. She was
also an Assistant United States Attorney in 1978 through 1981, and
ended up as Chief Appellate Attorney from 1980 to 1981.
Next to her is Mary Lee Warren, who is now the Deputy Assis-
tant Attorney General who has overall responsibility for the Nar-
cotics and Money Laundering Sections in the Department of
Justice. But notwithstanding her place in Justice now, she did have
a phenomenal career in the United States Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of New York, where she was an Assistant from
1980 through 1991, and was a legendary Chief of their Narcotics
Unit.
Next to her is Julie O'Sullivan, who is now a Professor at Ge-
orgetown Law Center. She served as an Assistant United States
Attorney in the Southern District between 1991 and 1994, and
thereafter worked in the Whitewater investigation under In-
dependent Counsel Robert Fiske.
Next to me is Judge John Martin, who now is a District Judge in
the Southern District of New York, but he started as an Assistant
in the Southern District from 1962 through 1966. He also served as
Chief Appellate Attorney in that office. After his time in the
United States Attorney's Office, he went to the Solicitor General's
Office from 1967 through 1969. After a time in private practice, he
returned as the United States Attorney for the Southern District of
New York in 1980 and served until 1983.
Next to him is Jerry Lynch, Professor and former Vice Dean at
Columbia Law School. He had two stints in the United States At-
torney's Office for the Southern District. From 1980 to 1983, he
was an Assistant and ended up as Chief Appellate Attorney. From
1990 to 1992, he returned to head the Criminal Division. In be-
tween, he was an Associate Counsel in Independent Counsel
Walsh's office while he was also teaching at Columbia.
Next to him is Laurie Levenson, Associate Dean for Academic
Affairs and a Professor at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles. She
is the imported talent on the panel, coming all the way from a ca-
reer in the United States Attorney's Office in Los Angeles. She
was there from 1981 through 1989, and headed both the Training
and the Appellate Sections.
Just to set up the discussion here, no doubt Bill Tendy would
disagree with any generalizations I make, but the traditional model
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that was the perceived wisdom for some time is that prosecutors
prosecute and investigators investigate. After choosing cases
within the agency, agents would develop a case, bring it to, the
United States Attorney's Office, where an Assistant would make a
discretionary decision about whether to go forward; should he de-
cide to go forward, the contours of the case would largely reflect
the investigation that the agency had conducted.
This model to some extent probably still describes a great many
cases prosecuted in the federal system, but not the ones that people
focus on. Increasingly, the model seems to be that Assistants are
developing cases in tandem with agents; they are making investiga-
tive choices; they are selecting what kinds of cases ought to be
prosecuted, making those points clear to the agencies. At the
Washington level, where Mary Lee Warren is, prosecutors are in-
creasingly playing a large role in steering agencies at the macro
level as to what kinds of cases they should take.
This raises some interesting questions. One is institutional com-
petence. Are prosecutors trained to be doing these sorts of things?
Are they trained to conduct investigations or to decide what kinds
of cases should be developed?
It also raises some questions when you see this trend in parallel
with a separate trend. There are a number of developments, par-
ticularly in the Sentencing Guidelines,' that have given prosecutors
an immense amount of power in how cases get disposed, with re-
gard to sentencing in particular. One of the justifications - or at
least explanations - given for why we should not feel so bad with
regard to the power that prosecutors are given in the Sentencing
Guidelines system is this: Prosecutors are increasingly seeing
themselves - and should be seen - as neutral magistrates in a
way, as people who are able to decide not just what will lead to the
largest sentence, but what disposition is most appropriate.
One big question that hangs over the system now is, to what ex-
tent are these two developments in tension? Can a prosecutor who
really sees himself as a partner of the agents in developing a case at
some point later step back and make the kinds of decisions about,
not just what is winnable, but what is right and appropriate in a
particular case? Are prosecutors trained to be able to conduct
themselves in- this very challenging environment? And, what role
1. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, UNITED STATES SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL]; Symposium, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Ten Years Later, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1231 (1997).
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should Main Justice play in structuring the kind of rules that guide
prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Offices?
What I would like to do, just to start the discussion, is turn to
Jerry Lynch, who wrote a provocative article that conceives of the
Sentencing Guidelines system as an opportunity for prosecutors to
act in this neutral role, to really dispense justice based on the par-
ticular circumstances of the case.2 The question I will start with to
Jerry is, to what extent can we really resolve the tension between
the role that you would like prosecutors to play under the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines and the role that they play as partners of agents?
PROF. LYNCH: I think what is hard about the problem is that
prosecutors have come to play virtually every role in the criminal
justice system, and, to some extent, one could make the case that
they have taken over all of those roles.
In a certain sense, Congress has delegated the task of making
substantive criminal law to federal prosecutors. Congress's policy
- not just as we saw earlier in federalism issues, but across-the-
board - seems to follow the policy of the somewhat cruel Viet-
nam-era joke, "Kill them all and let God sort them out. ' '3 Con-
gress has cast the federal prosecutor in the role of God. It has
criminalized everything and lets prosecutors decide what we really
want to prosecute.4
You can see this play out even with the President of the United
States. Is perjury in a civil case about a private sexual matter a
crime? Well, any first-year law student can answer that question as
a matter of law. But, of course, the newspapers have been full of
prosecutors debating what the "real" law is. Is the "real" law that
this is the kind of matter that would never - or should never - be
2. See generally Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998) [hereinafter Lynch, Administrative System] (assert-
ing that the adverserial/inquisitorial distinction in the American justice system is less
opposing in theory than in practice).
3. See, e.g., FULL METAL JACKET (Warner Bros. 1987). But see Douglas L. Trees,
History Lesson: Ward's Words are Medieval, NEWSDAY (New York), May 24, 1998, at
65 (attributing remark to papal representative during the Albigensian Crusade of
1209).
4. See Charles D. Bonner, Comment, The Federalization of Crime: Too Much of
a Good Thing?, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 905, 920-21 (1998) (examines the costs, benefits
and effectiveness of the current federalization of the current law and suggests a more
comprehensive approach utilizing all three branches of government); Robert Heller,
Comment, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need
for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309,
1311-13 (1997) (arguing for meaningful judicial review of federal prosecutors un-
checked discretion in making their charging decisions because of the constitutional
rights at issue).
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investigated, and therefore should be effectively legalized; or is the
"real" law that this kind of case is not really a crime unless it is
done sort of blatantly by someone who is prominent in the commu-
nity; or maybe it's not a "real" crime unless it is done by the Presi-
dent of the United States or someone else who is responsible for
law enforcement?
I am not interested here in what is the right answer to that ques-
tion; what is surprising and interesting is that there is so much de-
bate about the question. You can find out the answer to the legal
question by looking at a book and seeing what Congress passed.
But the question of what is the real practice, are people really be-
ing prosecuted for this sort of thing or not, should they be prose-
cuted or not, turns out to be rather hard to find out, because some
prosecutors think one thing, some think a different thing.
In a certain sense, we all agree that the "real" law is up to the
prosecutors. But there has not really been a lot of self-conscious
debate among prosecutors, so there is no consensus. It may turn
out that in one office a case like this would never be brought, but in
another office it might be a kind of case that would be.
You see a similar problem with Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). 5 As the law is written, practi-
cally every mail fraud case could be prosecuted under RICO, with
enhanced penalties - most significant frauds involve multiple
mailings over time, and usually involve some corporate entity or
other enterprise. Moreover, the civil dockets of the district courts
are filled with civil RICO cases most of them involving facts no
prosecutor would think of indicting criminally at all.6 But every
time a judge refuses to dismiss a civil RICO complaint, she is hold-
ing that the complaint charges a criminal offense punishable by
twenty years in jail.
What is the'real crime? What are the real criteria for RICO vio-
lations? Only the prosecutors know. But once again, it'is'not clear
that even they have any consistent criteria. There is not a lot of
self-conscious debate about this subject either.
5. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act was enacted as Title
IX of the Organized Crime Act of 1970. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941
(1970) [hereinafter RICO]; see generally GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CIVIL RICO: A DE-
FINITIVE GUIDE (1992).
6. See generally Gerard E. Lynch, Symposium, How Useful is Civil RICO in the
Enforcement of Criminal Law?, 35 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1990) [hereinafter Lynch, Civil
RICO] (arguing that if the judgement of prosecutors is sound in determining what
cases merit criminal prosecution, civil RICO suits may do more harm than good for
basic purposes of criminal law).
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In addition to the substantive criminal law, prosecutors also
make the procedural rules. Is it okay to bring a witness to the
Grand Jury eight or ten times? Well, I never did it. I cannot re-
member anybody I had in the Grand Jury as many as four times.
But it is legal.7
Is it okay to call a subject's mother to the Grand Jury to testify
about her daughter's sexual confidences? The law says it is okay.8
A lot of prosecutors think it is not okay, think they would not do
something like that. What gives prosecutors the authority to de-
cide that there should be a kind of quasi-privilege there? Some
prosecutors think there is. Others might think there is not.
Prosecutors are the judges. They decide who is guilty. We
should make no bones about that. Ninety-three percent of federal
cases in 1996 were disposed of without any kind of trial, either by
guilty pleas or by dismissal of the case before trial. 9
Who decided that those people were guilty? Not the judge, who
does a five-minute interview of the person, under Rule 11,11 getting
a kind of half-hearted, scripted confession as part of the guilty plea
process. Not a jury, which never sees the case. The prosecutor de-
cides whether the person was really guilty.
What procedures do they use? What burden of proof do they
apply? Is it good enough that the person would be convicted at
trial, or does the prosecutor have to believe himself or herself that
the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt? There is not a
lot of self-conscious debate about that. Each prosecutor is left to
make up his or her own rules.
Who sentences? Here again, not the judge most of the time.
Rather, it is the prosecutor who performs this function. Sophisti-
cated defense counsel know it. Sophisticated defense counsel
know that their opportunity to argue innocence or their opportu-
nity to argue leniency is not primarily before Judge Martin; it is
primarily before Mary Jo [White]. Actually, we do not even get to
7. See In re Pantojas, 639 F.2d 822, 824 (1st Cir. 1980) (stating that "grand juries
have the power to subpoena witnesses on more than one occasion").
8. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-23.211
(Aspen Law 1987) [hereinafter DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL]. A copy of the Manual is
also available online, and is updated regularly. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL (updated Jan. 8, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/
eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/> [hereinafter UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL].
9. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (visited Jan.
19, 1999) <http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t521.pdf> [hereinafter
Sourcebook].
10. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e).
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see Mary Jo. We may get to see Mark Pomerantz if we are lucky.
More likely, we see some line assistant, who looks younger and
younger to me every year, who is deciding what the appropriate
sentence is.
My article is an effort to kind of take a different tack. This sort
of presentation makes it sound like, "Oh my God, this is terrible,
the prosecutors are running the show," which is the way this usu-
ally sounds when you lay it out.
But my point is less to criticize than to insist that this really is our
system of justice. It is inevitably going to be the system in a regime
in which the resources are not there to try more than seven percent
of the cases. This is true in state courts as well as in federal courts.
The problem is, can we devise procedures, can we devise attitudes
on the part of prosecutors, can we devise training for prosecutors,
that will assist them in performing this role?
When I first started as a prosecutor, I remember thinking that in
every case they handed me, my job was to get the guy convicted -
because otherwise why would they have given me the case? - and
if I couldn't find enough evidence, I must be doing something
wrong, I must be failing in my job. After a few years, I realized
that was not necessarily the job. Maybe we want people being told
at the start that their job is rather broader than simply to make the
cases.
So, to me, this question of self-conscious debate is what is really
critical. It is vital that prosecutors realize the extraordinary power
that they have as de facto law makers and adjudicators, and that
they start to engage in discussion, among themselves and with
other citizens, of how they should exercise that power.
This does not necessarily mean formal guidance from the Justice
Department., No one who worked in the Southern District of New
York likes to think that the answer is to have someone in Washing-
ton tell local prosecutors what to do. But whether through formal
guidelines, or some other means, can there be some process for
thinking through this system, so that it can become a system in
which there are established practices, established rules, publicly
available knowledge about how the system works, so that prosecu-
tors can fairly, effectively, and with some measure of awareness
and consistency serve the many functions we entrust to them? Can
we develop a system where lawyers are trained to work in the real
criminal justice system dominated by prosecutors, and not continue
to pretend that the sort of phantom appellate review process that
1999]
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goes on at our occasional trials in court constitutes our real system
of adjudication?
PROF. RICHMAN: I think we should turn next to Judge Mar-
tin. I am not sure anyone on the panel would radically disagree
with the description that Jerry has given, so far as it goes, about the
system we have now. Let us turn to how to judge the result. It
sounds like you have been cut out of the action to some extent,
Judge Martin.
The question is, besides the fact that a twenty-nine-year-old is
doing the job that somebody over the age of forty could do, is there
anything about the result, anything about the process, that should
make us particularly disturbed about the way power has been
transferred?
JUDGE MARTIN: I was thinking, when you started out by say-
ing "looking at the traditional role as the investigators investigate
and the prosecutors prosecute," that you forgot to mention "and
the judge decides what sentence any person should get."
We have now walked away from that. That is a very disturbing
development, because when you put into the hands of one person
the decision of what crime to investigate, who to prosecute, and
what the sentence should be, you have taken out of the system any
check or balance.
Let me give you a true example. A somewhat-distant relative
came to see me. He had taken a job, by answering an ad in the
paper for a financial analyst, and went to work for a venture capital
company. After a while there he realized that a lot of people were
paying the fees and not getting much by the way of capital. He
became disturbed, started to look around, and ultimately left. An
investigation starts, and he goes in and tells his story.
Ultimately, the Assistant U.S. Attorney says *to him: "You've
got a choice: if you want to plead guilty, we will limit your offense
conduct to one transaction in which you were involved, your
Guidelines range will be zero to six months; or, if you do not want
to plead, then we are going to charge you with all of the fraud
committed by this company and your Guidelines range will be
thirty-three months."
Now, fortunately, this kid said, "Hey, I didn't do anything
wrong," and told his lawyer, "I am not pleading." It turned out to
be a bluff and he was not indicted.
But that is the power that is there. And not only is it there, but it
is done in secret. This is not public sentencing. And I am having a
running debate with Mary Jo on their refusal to make recommen-
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dations in very serious cases, because I think that part of the pro-
cess of sentencing should be a public exposure of all of the
considerations that go into the decisions.
I have recently written to the Advisory Committee on the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure suggesting that we make public
the pre-sentence reports, so that the public can fairly judge what
sentences are being imposed.
I have had numerous cooperator cases where the U.S. Attorney
wants me to impose a sentence that the public will think is irra-
tional, but will not go on the line and say, "That is really what we
want you to do."
But the problem with the Guidelines is really their secret nature,
the totally non-public, non-reviewable discretion that is in fact
given to some people who are as old as twenty-nine.
I think, as a judge, I am a firm believer in departure from the
Sentencing Guidelines. 1 I think that the judges really are going to
have to seize on departure to take control back in the situation
where you get a totally inappropriate sentence.
I have done it both ways. Mary Jo confessed error to me when I
increased a sentence over the sentence that had been worked out
by the government in one of their secret deals.
Was that enough to stir the water?
MS. WHITE: I think I get to respond. Just to disagree with a
couple of the premises, first. I do not think things are so different,
except for - and it is a huge "except" - the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and what that does to the judge's discretion, or lack
thereof, in imposing sentence. I think we have for many years, cer-
tainly in New York and elsewhere, investigated along with the in-
vestigative agencies, as well as prosecuting. But the Sentencing
Guidelines do, vintroduce another element of discretion for
prosecutors':
I was about to ask Jerry who hired him and who trained him if he
did not know what his job was and thought his job was "I am fail-
ing if I don't get enough evidence to convict," because I think -
and I mean this very seriously - prosecutors don't think that is
their job - they think it is to do justice and the right thing.
JUDGE MARTIN: That is a subtle attack on me, since I hired
him.
MS. WHITE: I know that, but I wasn't going to say that, John.
You see how you get these Freudian slips?
11. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 1, § 5K1.
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But seriously, we do deal effectively with a lot of these problems.
There is no question there is tremendous discretion. If it is not
exercised wisely, if it is abused one iota, it is the worst thing there
can be in our system. I also believe that giving prosecutors discre-
tion is very important to the public good, however.
First of all, when I hire people, to every single applicant I see, I
make this speech - and I mean it. I think the public has unfortu-
nately become very cynical about it - but the job of a prosecutor
really is to do justice. I do not know about an independent, neutral
magistrate. That is a little different job than we have. But we are
here to do justice.
We talk a lot about that objective in the hiring process. We do a
lot of due diligence about how is this person with this stellar r6-
sum6, often a relatively young person, going to be able to handle
the job of doing justice the day they walk in the door and are given
tremendous powers. And even more powers today, because of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. We do not hire people, despite
those stellar r6sum6s, whom we have a concern about. That does
not mean you always make perfect hiring decisions.
My colleague, Mark Pomerantz, meets with the new Assistants
the first day they come in and gives the same speech. You must
reinforce that, because that really is the nature of being a prosecu-
tor. Now, is that troubling? I mean, obviously it is troubling if it
miscarries, and so the training is extremely important.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, attempt to ensure that the
Assistant is doing what the Assistant is supposed to be doing -
and we get criticized for this. He or she is supposed to be pleading
out a case at the highest readily provable offense, not "bargain
basementing" it as a way of leveraging a better plea.' 2
Our running debate on this issue that John is mentioning now I
find very ironic - and we have had this debate back and forth, and
we have it coming up again I think, so we will see how it comes :out.
But the judges complain, "We have lost our discretion to you."
In our office - and we get beat up by the defense attorneys
about this, too - we have the cooperators plead to the full range
of their criminal conduct, and we think we should do that. You
also hear the criticism that the government "makes sweetheart
deals with the Devil." The judge should have the full range of dis-
cretion to sentence every cooperator for whatever he or she has
12. See UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 8, § 9-27.300.
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done, even if we did not know about that conduct when they came
in the door.
We do not, by the terms of cooperation agreements, make sen-
tencing recommendations. It has been that way in the office for
many years. We have returned the sentencing discretion to the
judges on cooperators that they have otherwise been deprived of
having under the Guidelines. They apparently do not wish to have
it.
JUDGE MARTIN: I want to keep it. I just want you to go on
record to tell the public, when I sentence somebody who has com-
mitted five murders to seven years in jail, that that is exactly the
sentence you wanted.
MS. WHITE: And you would have wanted us to do that in the
pre-Guidelines era.
JUDGE MARTIN: Absolutely.
MS. WHITE: But we did not under some U.S. Attorney - I do
not know who it was.
JUDGE MARTIN: Morgenthau.
MS. WHITE: Morgenthau, right. Not Martin, certainly.
Anyway, I do not think things are so bad or so different. That is
the bottom line.
PROF. LYNCH: Well, in one way they are different. Once you
start to think of the power of the prosecutor in a more systematic
way, you start to look at something like the Guidelines even more
dramatically. It is not just how it affects sentencing as such.
From 1986 to 1996, that disposition rate that I mentioned went
up from about eighty-five percent to close to ninety-five percent. 13
Now, I do not know what the right number is or how many trials
you need to keep prosecutors honest, but once you start thinking
of the prosecutors as the primary dispensers of justice, then you
start to. think of trials in a different way. It is not just a matter of
adjudicating some particular case. It is also that the trials are what
tell prosecutors how cases are likely to come out, so that they can
start to apply those rules, the outcomes that are predicted by the
trial system, in the cases where there is not going to be a trial.
The fewer trials there are, the greater the disparity between the
kind of sentence that you can expect to get if you plead guilty and
the kind of sentence that you are going to get if you are prosecuted
at trial. The broader the laws are, the fewer the defenses, the more
a defendant is relegated to arguing points of justice, not as matters
13. See Sourcebook, supra note 9.
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of law, but as issues of prosecutorial discretion or mercy: "Well
yes, under the law it is strict liability, and I should be convicted; but
is it really fair to prosecute me?"
The more that argument has to be made to the prosecutor and
the less ability there is to say, "I do not like your judgment, Mr.
Prosecutor or Ms. Prosecutor; I am going to court and I am going
to fight the case" - as the stakes become too high for defendants
to do that, as the trial rate goes down, the prosecutor's power in-
creases and the checks on the prosecutor's power are reduced -
not just about the sentence, but about the issue of guilt or inno-
cence as well.
PROF. LEVENSON: There is another problem. We all agree
that you need to have training of prosecutors, but that sounds a lot
easier than it is. One of the things you think about is the range of
types of training that you have to give prosecutors, given the vari-
ous roles that Jerry mentioned.
You know, prosecutors now have to learn, as suggested by our
prior panel, about the nature of local crime and street gangs. They
are going to have to learn about new technology, they have to learn
about international crimes, they have to learn about Guidelines,
some of them have to learn how to 'deal with the media, they have
to learn a great deal about the negotiation process, and even less so
now about the trial process.
This is a wide range of training. If you think about how long that
takes, most offices cannot accomplish it in the time allocated for
training. Typically, although' it depends on the office, training may
be the first six months, the first year, and then it slacks off to a less
formal type of training with the supervisors. And yet, all of us in
this room would agree you could not possibly get all that training
in such a short time..
The other thing is while you are training these people the rules
often change. A great deal of wisdom that was in the U.S. Attor-
ney's Office went out the window when the Guidelines came in,
because even the old prosecutors were not quite sure how to oper-
ate under these Guidelines. And yet, we know that if we are going
to have the type of training that it sounds like we want, we are
going to-want to keep prosecutors in the office longer than they
traditionally stay because of the revolving door.
So it is just too much of an out to say "give them the training and
that will take care of all the problems with broad discretion that
they have." I am not sure that a prosecutor could get trained
690
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before the time he leaves with everything he needs to do and still
exercise that discretion.
MS. WARREN: I definitely agree with the last point, that the
training goes on throughout the whole period of time that they are
there. I see it as some formal training, after a good decision on
who you are choosing to come in, With particular emphasis on
judgment.
Prior U.S. Attorneys used to require an inordinate number of
years between graduation from law school and beginning at the
U.S. Attorney's Office, just for some measure of judgment, one
would hope, to come with the ticking of the clock.
But there will be specific training on what new rules or proce-
dures that an Assistant needs to 'learn, particularly one who has no
day-to-day training or has not had a view of the criminal law. But
the real training, I think, is with your peers and with your supervi-
sors that continues throughout. The best U.S. Attorney's Offices
are those with those doors open all the time.
Washington runs lots of training in specialized areas. But in
terms of judgment and sounding out what is an appropriate exer-
cise of discretion here, I think that happens every day.
I do not think things are so different today. I certainly believe
training is important, but I think we need to give credit for the
informal training that happens forever.
PROF. LEVENSON: I will give credit for that. But I do think
adding the Guidelines was a substantial new responsibility. Prose-
cutors traditionally trained - and I did the training - when they
came in, for how to present a case at-trial, and then they moved on
to how to supervise an investigation. But this is a whole new
world. What I hear judges complaining about seems to be mostly
on that end, whether prosecutors are getting that type of training
or judgment with regard to the Guidelines.
PROF. RICHMAN: I guess one perspective to get is that of the
line assistant. Since I am the moderator, I do not have to speak
about it, but I can turn to Julie O'Sullivan, who was a line assistant
with me. We got some training.
PROF. O'SULLIVAN: I remember getting actually a lot of
training on Guidelines materials and a lot of memos about the
"highest readily provable count" requirement and the like. Actu-
ally, the memos we got were much clearer than the actual DOJ
Guidelines, if you read them. The Southern District had distilled it
down to something that seemed to make sense.
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I would just throw out a thought here. My own feeling is that
there has been probably too much emphasis on the extent to which
prosecutors' discretion has been enhanced, and not enough on
whether judges are actually performing their responsibilities under
Chapter 6 of the Guidelines.' 4
The studies show that three-quarters of the judges - and I know
the empirical evidence is really soft because it is very hard to regu-
late this kind of thing - do not wait for the pre-sentence report
before accepting or rejecting a plea agreement.' 5 The theory is that
at a minimum, you have to do this in order to find out whether the
parties are complying with the Guidelines.
And two-thirds of the judges feel that it is inappropriate for
them to reject a charge bargain,' 6 even though the Guidelines
clearly contemplate that that should be the case. The judges do it
for reasons that certainly one is sympathetic to; that is, they think
the Guidelines are too harsh in a particular case, they are uncom-
fortable constitutionally with rejecting a prosecutor's preferred
charge, and also, are uncomfortable with the visibility (they are the
ones who are essentially saying, "No, this is not harsh enough.").
So what I think is interesting is the extent to which judges are
not using their Chapter 6 powers to say to prosecutors, for exam-
ple, "Have the parties been engaging in fact-or-factor bargaining?"
or "Has the prosecutor agreed to leave off twenty grams of crack in
return for a plea?" The judge could ask, "Are these facts in this
stipulation true, counsel?," because, obviously, it is a totally ethical
violation to lie in presenting these facts.17
The judge also could ask, "Is this the highest readily provable
count?" It is not up to judges to enforce that DOJ policy, but the
Guidelines track that policy.
So in looking at prosecutorial discretion, we not only need to
look at trial as a means of constraining discretion, bit.also poten-
tially at sentencing proceedings to see how judges perhaps 'more
effectively could constrain prosecutors.
PROF. RICHMAN: I guess that would lead to a question for
Judge Martin. What happens when you have two parties before
14. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 6B1.1-6B1.3.
15. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IM-
PACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING 24 (1991).
16. See id.
17. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5) (1997);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(1) (1997).
PANEL DISCUSSION
you, the government and defense counsel, who are quite adamant
that this fraud involved $1.2 million, who say "We have worked this
out, and no will tell you otherwise?" Will you pursue this, given the
possibility that this really is a $4 million fraud?
JUDGE MARTIN: Probably not, because I have a problem
with the concept that you should not be able to bargain over a
sentencing dispute. After all, if the government has a fifty-percent
chance of convicting somebody of a $4 million fraud and the per-
son will plead to a $2 million fraud, isn't that what justice would
demand as a rational result? I mean, all plea bargains ultimately
are a reflection of that. So I do not have a problem with that.
I have problems when I see them being applied inconsistently,
and I have called them on that a couple of times, at least called
them to explain why it is in this case it seems that everybody that
went to trial had more than minimal planning when anybody who
didn't did not. Those things come up.
PROF. LYNCH: Well, I think it is a little naive to talk about
what is "really" a $4 million fraud. What does "really" mean
there? You have these drug cases where the evidence is a scrap of
paper on which somebody wrote "Jos6 4," and a DEA expert will
then come in and testify that means Jos6 got four kilograms of her-
oin a week for five years. But when the person pleads guilty and
becomes a cooperator, it turns out that, once you get the benefit of
his "truthful" testimony, then you know that "Jos6 4" actually
meant that Jos6 got four grams of cocaine once.
Of course, what we have really is proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that someone was a drug dealer and a highly disputable issue
about what that scrap of paper means, and someone has to make a
decision about what is an appropriate sentence for this defendant.
It seems to mela-rather strange notion, a very naive notion, of the
way the world works to say that this guy has to be forced to plead
to some extraordinary Guidelines level because the highest readily
provable offense is four kilograms times fifty-two weeks times five
years.
No prosecutor really thinks that way, and so there is a lot of
backing off from these Guidelines. It is sometimes not quite as
stark as "the fix is in" and the prosecutor hides the "real" facts, but
other times the prosecutor tells the judge what the "real" facts are.
The real facts are in dispute, and that is why there is litigation.
And, just as the real facts about guilt are sometimes so much in
dispute that there's a chance that at a trial the defendant might get
acquitted altogether, sometimes the facts are in dispute about these
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sentencing factors. The natural tendency in litigation in that cir-
cumstance is to settle. The natural tendency is to decide something
is acceptable to both sides.
What does it mean to say that the judge should go behind that
agreement and get the "real" facts? Where are the "real" facts? In
practice, the fantasy that someone has the real facts leads to the
police. The agent has the real facts because he investigated the
case, and he will tell you that Jos6. is a terrible guy who got four
kilograms - and probably more - every week. And somehow
that is supposed to be the "real" facts? Why should that version be
canonized, rather than the stipulation based on what the lawyers
thought could actually be proved?
MS. WHITE: Well, Judge Martin has gone behind the stipula-
tions and he has actually brought that to my attention, when his
distinct impression is that the parties have stipulated below what
seems to be obviously the highest readily provable offense, or even
a level below that. That should not be happening. I am not saying
it does not happen.
One of the problems with the Guidelines, I think, across the
board h in the appellate and district courts, and the prosecutors'
offices, and among defense attorneys - is we are not intellectually
honest with them as much as we should be.
We do have a policy that really limits discretion, but nobody re-
ally likes us to follow that policy, which is you plead to the highest
readily provable offense, because typically if you are using your
discretion, you are coming down, you are being more lenient, you
are not going the other way. We are not supposed to be going
down or up from what the charging policy dictates.
So I do not think the whole problem is discretion. There is no
question the Guidelines have injected more discretionary issues,
but part of what they have injected is everybody twisting and con-
torting, frankly, to do justice, including I think, judges as weli as
prosecutors and defense attorneys. Maybe that isn't so bad and the
problem is being exaggerated.
JUDGE MARTIN: Can I go back from the Guidelines, as much
as I like to beat up on the Guidelines, to something that was said,
that things have not really changed in the role of the U.S. Attor-
neys? Professor Richman asked me if I would be the old man on
the panel. Since I accept senior citizen discounts, I guess I cannot
deny that.
But the role really has changed dramatically. I became an Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney in 1962. And yes, you had a Securities Fraud
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Unit that did investigations, but to a much lesser extent than today.
You had an Organized Crime Unit just starting up. But, by. and
large, we sat there and waited for the agencies to come and bring
cases to us.
I think Jerry in his article underscores some of the problem with
that. Among other things; you are losing a step of discretion; you
are losing the step where somebody takes an independent look at
something and says, "This is the right thing to do here."
We are honoring Bill Tendy today,' 8 and I think of a time I went
to him. I was investigating and Isaid, "Look, I got this guy and he
is willing to become an informant. What do you think?"
Bill said to me, "No. You should let him plead. He is a kid now
who, if he pleads today, can get youthful offender treatment. If
you make him an informant, he is going to be too old by the time
he comes to plead to get youthful offender treatment. If he gets
youthful offender treatment, his record can be wiped out and he
will end up with a clean record."
Now, that was a tremendous insight. But it was somebody who
was detached from the process who could come in and make that
judgment. When you are intimately involved in the investigation,
that step is missing.
I think we are a nation, in many respects, that abhors discretion.
Just try and fire a government employee, for this, that,. and the
other thing.
But in the decision whether to indict somebody for a crime,
whether the charge should be with a maximum exposure of a year
or twenty, there is no process.
MS. WHITE: But, John, you know of case after case where the
Assistants - and I do think the Assistants, at least since the 1970s,
have been, very active, before the Guidelines kicked. in - where
they,,unlike their agency counterparts - I am not saying it hap-
pens all the time, and I understand exactly the point you are mak-
ing - but the Assistants will investigate and say, "No, we are not
going to do this. . It's not strong enough." Whereas, sometimes
when the investigation comes in packaged by zealous agents, they
also should be saying, "No," once they review it, but the lack of
familiarity with the facts may make it more likely that a case is
prosecuted when it shouldn't be.
18. See Hon. Louis Freeh, Symposium, Keynote Address, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
649 (1999). .
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But I do think they exercise their discretion as part of the inves-
tigative team in ways that are very often very helpful to the defend-
ants and not going forward with prosecutions.
JUDGE MARTIN: But I think it is also important that you
have the U.S. Attorney's Office review processes. The fact is that
any lawyer can come in and say "I would like this reviewed by your
superior," but I think part of the problem is the bar does not know
that.
MS. WHITE: Unless they hire Jerry.
JUDGE MARTIN: That is right. But I remember Ron Fis-
chetti19 came to me in a case - unsuccessfully, but he came any-
how - with another very experienced lawyer who did heavier
criminal-type work than many people sitting here. He looked
around and said, "I have never been here before." They never
think about that.
I think it is very important that the bar know that there is a chain
of command that you should pursue if you think it appropriate -
because this is where it is going to be decided.
PROF. LYNCH: The role of defense counsel is something that
needs to be discussed. We have too many prosecutors and ex-pros-
ecutors on the panel, and not enough defense lawyers, and espe-
cially defense lawyers who are not former prosecutors, because the
role of defense counsel is very important here.
De facto, in the real criminal justice system that operates in the
U.S. Attorney's Office, there is not a presumption of innocence,
there is a presumption of guilt. When the agents bring somebody
in - and there is the evidence right there in the complaint that the
agents swore to - the guy is guilty, right? The prosecutor is not
going to call in all of those witnesses to have them testify first-hand
in the Grand Jury, the way Zach was talking about in the state
court,20 or even interviewing them himself or herself.
The agent says, "This is what the proof is," and that is the proof
until and unless an activist defense lawyer comes in and gives the
prosecutor a reason to think that the case needs to be investigated
more deeply. Here I am talking more about the cases that are re-
active, where the agents bring them in.
19. Ronald P. Fischetti is a solo practioner based in New York City, specializing in
criminal defense. See Today's News, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 12, 1997, at 1.
20. See Panel Discussion: The Prosecutor's Role in Light of Expanding Federal
Criminal Jursidiction, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 657 (1999) [hereinafter Expanding Fed-
eral Criminal Jurisdiction].
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In long-term investigations, the situation may be a bit different.
On one hand, maybe the prosecutor is more partisan, because she
sees herself as part of the investigative team. On the other hand,
because the prosecutor is more involved from the start, the prose-
cutor has a deeper knowledge of the facts, has personally examined
witnesses and documents, and so is maybe in a better position to
make judgments about guilt or innocence than in the reactive case.
Defense lawyers have to come in and make those arguments and
go over the head of the individual prosecutor, if necessary, and
work out what is not so much a deal as a verdict or judgment about
the case. Plea bargaining is not so much about haggling; plea bar-
gaining is about making arguments on the merits, the same argu-
ments that might be made to a jury or to a judge, but being made
to the prosecutor.
So defense lawyers play, or could play, a very important role in
this system. But, as John says, many practitioners are not very
aware of that, precisely because the education and training of law-
yers is not about this phantom accusatory system in which every-
body is going to go to trial, and everything important happens in
court.
MS. WHITE: Much of the defense bar in New York are alumni
of our offices, which I think is a very healthy thing and a good thing
for defendants. I totally agree that the whole bar should know
about the process and it should be a very activist one, because
there is an open-door policy at the U.S. Attorney's Office, even my
door. No one wants to go through it, though, when they can get to
talk to Mark Pomerantz instead of me.
But everybody really is trying to do the right thing. That does
not mean you do not get an overly zealous view of a case from time
to time, and then you've got to take it up.
JUDGE MARTIN: That is true in New York. Is it true
everywhere?
MS. WARREN: I would say, judging from the bottom ranks - I
never reached these exalted realms - that my view is that was
certainly true. I was also a defense lawyer for five years, I should
probably fully disclose that.
My view is that, at least for the smaller general crimes and
smaller major crimes, that was not the process. That was the pro-
cess in big cases. I am not sure why that was, but a lot of times
things just stopped with the Assistant.
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It also seemed .to me that a lot of the Assistants really did have
the sense that they were supposed to do justice and they were sup-
posed to take a step back and at least attempt to be impartial.
But there was a sense that, because you were actively involved in
a case, it is hard to step back and say, "They are not guilty" or
"You should not go forward."
I also think that what should be explored a little bit more in light
of Jerry's article is the issue of resources as affecting prosecutors'
discretionary decisions about what kinds of deals to cut. 21 But it
seemed to me resources affected prosecutors' identification of
themselves - that they were thinking Of themselves not as admin-
istrators doing justice, that their primary allegiance was not to do
justice in, say, November, because funding is dependent on num-
bers. There was a push. There was a real mixed message that peo-
ple were receiving in these circumstances.
PROF. LEVENSON: I agree with Julie on the last point. When
you put the prosecutor in the role of a leader of sorts in an investi-
gation, that by itself is not necessdirily bad. In fact, I would say that
prosecutors could do a pretty good job, if you look at them as coor-
dinators, peacemakers - because you often have agencies that
would tear each other apart if you .did not have somebody in the
middle - a team leader.
But the big problem is who is setting the priorities, and that gets
into a whole other issue of whether those priorities are set by that
particular prosecutor, by the head of that office, or by Mary Lee
Warren and-the people in the Justice Department, and-how in fact
that affects the relationship.
If you are a'prosecutor and you are trying to coordinate an in-
vestigation, but you have been given 'marching orders, it will be
harder to keep an open mind because you know you have someone
looking over your shoulder.
PROF. RICHMAN: Mary Lee, where should policy be made
with regard to the selection of cases?"I think the Southern District
has .its view.
MS. WARREN: I think it is a shared responsibility, and, hope-
fully, it is a responsibility where various sides can live together.
More and more offices are doing strategic plans of their own - for
example, what is the threat assessment of the crime in the area -
and working with the state and local prosecutors that [Zachary
21. See Lynch, Administrative System, supra note 2, at 2140.
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Carter] spoke about, 22 but also in terms of what is new or what is
the largest threat in this area and trying to divvy up their resources
based on that.
In addition, in Washington we try and look at it on a national
scale. That may not be the impact in one particular office, but an
importance that we can see sometimes through glasses that we
have wiped off ahead of time, that is going to affect many districts.
I am thinking particularly in the narcotics area recently, the
emergence of methamphetamine. We could watch it grow and
grow and grow on the West Coast, but we could also watch the
meth as it moved towards the Midwest. We have an important role
there in trying to alert the U.S. Attorney's Offices, as well as the
law enforcement agencies, that they are going to have to devote
more resources and be more vigilant to this emerging area.
Sometimes the policy or the strategy is set for a national impact.
For example, indicting a single telemarketing case might not have
the same impact as many districts indicting the same day on similar
schemes, giving notice to those who would venture in this area that
the Federal Government will proceed against them with some
sternness.
So there is some give-and-take in this equation, and sometimes
Washington is accused of an initiative or a "priority de jour," but
we have so many. For the most part, I think it sifts out to a fairly
agreeable relationship.
PROF. RICHMAN: You identify a problem, you tell the U.S.
Attorney's'Offices to keep track of it and do it where appropriate.
Most of the U.S. Attorney's Offices. are headed by people who
have their own political .agenda. They all say, "This is terribly in-
teresting, we will talk to you, get in line."
What are you going to do next?. Are you going to cut funding,
are you going to do anything that involves your muscle, or is this
just a working relationship?
MS. WARREN: Usually it is a working relationship, but some-
times it is an exercise of pumping iron from Washington. If a large
metropolitan district has a major narcotics problem that the
Mayor, and even the President of our country, are complaining
about, and that particular U.S. Attorney's Office is doing very few
narcotics cases of any worth then there is a problem and we do
intercede there.
22. See Expanding Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 660-75 (state-
ments of Zachary W. Carter).
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For instance, there are Assistants assigned across the nation to
the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
("OCDEF").23 That original allocation was made in 1982. It does
not make a lot of sense today.
We really need to look at the allocation of those resources. If
they are not being well used in some districts, then they might have
fewer in the next year.
I was talking to some Assistants from San Juan who are here.
That island has grown exponentially in its violence problem, and
most of it attributed to narcotics. They have four OCDEF attor-
neys in that office and 1.8 Assistants. That is an allocation from
1982 that makes no sense today. That is the way we can exercise
that discretion.
PROF. RICHMAN: Let's get a foreign perspective. We should
ask Laurie Levenson from outside the Southern District to what
extent Washington played a part in her life or her office's life.
PROF. LEVENSON: I think things have gotten better. That is
the way I will put it.
MS. WARREN: It is the new personalities.
PROF. LEVENSON: Exactly. Really, there was at one point -
I will not say under which U.S. Attorney - a view that Washington
was the enemy. Especially when you are far away geographically,
it is hard to believe that officials in Washington really have a feel
for the community needs.
There also was a complaint about the lack of resources. The say-
ing was "the closer you were to the Beltway, the molt resources
you would have." I think that has balanced out, by and large.
But there is still the question remaining, who is in the best situa-
tion to assess the needs of the community? Washington is helpful,
in that it can see national patterns. But we all know that in our
individual communities, being a local person and having those con-
tacts with, for example, local FBI agents, really cannot be replaced.
I see this as an area where some of the conflicts will come up.
23. The U.S. Department of Justice's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Force program was initiated in 1982. The program funds and operates task forces in
thirteen cities that target high-level drug traffickers and money laundering organiza-
tions. These task forces include state and local law enforcement, as well as federal
investigative agencies, and are coordinated by the U.S. Attorney's offices in those
cities. See Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual 'Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug
Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1183 (1995) (describing
multi-jurisdictional drug control initiatives in which federal officials make the final
decisions on priorities and policies, while non-federal agents provide input and
manpower).
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I am not sure what the answer is. I do not know that the "weed
and seed" program alone or going out and telling school kids "do
not commit federal crimes" is going to get the necessary impact. It
is also unclear how you go out and put together a group of liaisons
with the various leaders of your community.
Part of this, I think, is the tension in what a federal prosecutor's
office does. Does it serve the needs of its district, or is it just an
arm of federal law enforcement? That, I think, has been a continu-
ing tension since I was in the office.
PROF. RICHMAN: I think one interesting perspective on the
work between agents and investigators can come from Julie
O'Sullivan, who saw it in two very different contexts, both in the
Southern District of New York and in the Whitewater investiga-
tion. I was curious to what extent being in that different circum-
stance, without talking about the role of Independent Counsel
("IC"), can inform our discussion of how prosecutors do interact
with agents in the selection of targets, or at least in decisions about
how to allocate resources.
PROF. O'SULLIVAN: I was in Little Rock for over eight
months with Bob Fiske. I should also say I worked for Ken Starr
for a couple of months, just to be sure everybody knows where I
am talking from.
Actually, it was really interesting because there was a completely
different feeling in the IC context. First of all, in the IC situation,
lawyers are defining your jurisdiction, and so lawyers are from the
beginning, ifroin the inception of the case, defining the investiga-
tory priorities and how you are going to proceed, even picking the
agents - I mean, it is really very different. It starts off differently
and proceeds forward.
What was also interesting was the differences in culture. I was
not working with the U.S. Attorney's Office there, but certainly we
heard a lot about it from the agents, and I actually talked to some
of the Assistants on other cases. What was interesting is that they
had a completely different way of doing cases. The agents came to
them with completed cases ready to be indicted. They took the old
model very seriously. The agents investigated, the prosecutors
prosecuted. There were some exceptions, but overall that was defi-
nitely the model.
As a result, between local agents and a lot of Southern District-
trained Assistants - I was not the only Southern District person
down there - there was some tension in the beginning, because we
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not only wanted to attend witness interviews, we actually wanted to
conduct them, which seemed very foreign to the agents.
It was unfortunate because I think the local agents undervalued
our expertise as far as the law was concerned, and we definitely
undervalued the agents' expertise. Essentially, by requiring them
to just sit there and be scribes, we were losing a lot of value. I
think both the lawyers and agents came to recognize this, and over
time it became a much more cooperative enterprise. But it was a
very striking difference.
MS. WARREN: Could I comment there on an even more for-
eign perspective that I have now? The Department works with
many other justice ministries around the world, particularly in
Latin America now.24 Many of those countries are in this enor-
mous transition from a civil code country, an inquisitorial system,
to a more accusatory, adversarial system.25
We are in the particular role now of encouraging them to include
the investigative agencies in the investigations. Because it is so for-
eign to them- it really should be a "task force approach"- there
is a lot to be learned. It has really led to a greater appreciation on
my part, as I have argued this role of why they need to have the
investigators inside as well.
Let me share one particular insight I got from the Honduras Jus-
tice Minister. There, and not just because they are a civil code
country, but because of excesses of police and the military in the
past, all the discretion and all the investigative function rested with
a prosecutor/investigating magistrate role and no evidence was ac-
cepted that was not directed by that person, including, on a search
warrant, that the prosecutor was the first through the door. I ex-
plained "not for us," that there is a better sort of allocation of
roles.
It is interesting now to look at what we have taken for granted.
PROF. LYNCH: Bob Litt ended the first panel by asking
whether we were being parochial in a time sense; 26 that is, is the
federalism problem that they talked about a long-term trend to-
24. See, e.g.,.Janet Reno Urges Law-Enforcement Cooperation with Mexico, Dow
Jones News Service, Nov. 9, 1998.
25. See, e.g., Luz Estella Nagle, Evolution of the Colombian Judiciary and the Con-
stitutional Court, 6 IND. INT'L &'CoMP. L. REV. 59, 68 (1995) ("Probably the most
significant provision effecting the judiciary is the shifting from a system in which
judges brought charges against defendants, the so-called inquisitorial system, to a
prosecutorial system modeled on the common law adversarial system in the United
States where charges are brought by a -government prosecutor.").
26. See. Expanding Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 676.
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ward federalization of criminal law, or is that just a tralsitory phe-
nomenon, an artifact of the time?
I suppose I would like to ask, are we being parochial geographi-
cally when we talk about this aggressive role of prosecutors as in-
vestigators, about the way prosecutors handle their roles as judge
and jury and executioner? Is the kind of sensible exercise of dis-
cretion, the kind of open-door policy, the kind of role for -defense
lawyers that Mary Jo and others have talked about, limited to New
York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, a few big-city, sophisti-
cated U.S. Attorney's Offices that have a particular kind of prac-
tice, that do a lot of big investigations, exercise a lot of discretion;
or is that a national phenomenon? How is prosecutorial discretion
being exercised across the country?.
It is fine to say: "Well, you know, we've got good training pro-
grams, and we pick people very carefully, and we tell them about
the traditions of Bob Fiske and Bill"Tendy and John: Martin, and
this is the way justice is supposed -to be done by .prosecutors." Is
that how it is in Little Rock? Is that how it is in Nashville? Is that
how it is with independent prosecutors?,
You know, this resource question is a very important one. A lot
of the real check on what a prosecutor does is simply that there,. is
just not enough money. to do certain kinds of abuses in a routine
case.
If your mandate is, find the truth, leave no stone unturned, and
you have an unlimited budget for a single case, the prosecutor's
power is vastlymagnified. A lot of prosecutors might have said,
"You kn6w, you can't prosecute these perjury cases about 'he said,
she said' and sexual behavior, because how are you-ever going to
prove the truth?" That might be true on a limited budget, but if
you have no constraints maybe not. You can dig up Jefferson and
check his DNA; why not?
If you look at everybody's book purchases and interrogate eve-
rybody's mother, and you look at everybody's dresses and you go
through the contents of everyone's closets and do DNA testing on
everything that comes out of their underwear drawer, maybe we
can prove these things. The law lets prosecutors do all these things.
But, realistically, most prosecutors cannot and would not do them
in this kind of case, because they've .got something else on the ta-
ble, and not enough money to do all of those things in every case.
The budget requires you to have a sense of proportion.
Unleash a prosecutor with the powers that we have been talking
about, the discretion that we have been talking about, give him an
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unlimited budget, and instructions to go find the truth at any cost
to any other priority, and you've got an incredible potential for
abuse.
JUDGE MARTIN: If anyone has read the book Blood Sport,
that is exactly the speech that Bernard Nussbaum made to Presi-
dent Clinton when he said he should not appoint a Special
Prosecutor.27
MS. WHITE: To answer your question directly, I think there are
tremendous variations across the country. Zach has sat on the At-
torney General's Advisory Committee, as have I, where you have
fifteen or twenty U.S. Attorneys from around the country. You sit
there and you realize in about ten minutes that you are all talking
about very, very different worlds.
It is not always, though, I think, in the direction of more discre-
tion, unbridled discretion. In fact, it may be the opposite. I think
you do have a lot of offices, unlike the ones we are talking about,
where the agents do investigate, the prosecutors do prosecute,
where you never see anybody contorting over the Guidelines stipu-
lation is it the highest readily provable offense, and there are no
5Kls, 28 or one or two, where there is less discretion being exercised
too. But I think the point is very well taken. I think it is very
different.
PROF. LEVENSON: And I think different models are not nec-
essarily bad. I mean, this is healthy. One size does not fit all.
Whereas we can get information from Washington, direction from
Washington, resources from Washington, assistance from Washing-
ton, there are still all the individual U.S. Attorney's Offices. I, for
one, would not like to see them as just branches of the Washington
office.
PROF. RICHMAN: I will not go down the dangerous path of
suggesting that New York is not the center of the world.
I think we should end this panel discussion. I thank the panelists
very much. It was a fascinating discussion.
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28. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 1, § 5K1.
